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Abstract
We investigate three ways in which rms can become prominentand thereby
inuence the order in which consumers consider options. First, rms can a¤ect
an intermediarys sales e¤orts by means of commission payments. When rms pay
commission to a salesman, the salesman promotes the product with the highest com-
mission, and steers ignorant consumers towards the more expensive product. Second,
sellers can advertise prices on a price comparison website, so that consumers inves-
tigate the suitability of products in order of increasing price. In such a market,
equilibrium prices are lower when search costs are higher since a rms benet from
being investigated rst increases with search costs. Finally, consumers might rst
consider their existing supplier when they purchase a new product, which suggests a
relatively benign rationale for the prevalence of cross-selling in markets such as retail
banking.
Keywords: Consumer search, e-commerce, price comparison websites, cross-selling,
mis-selling, commission sales.
1 Introduction
In many markets, consumers are initially imperfectly informed about the deals available,
and must invest e¤ort to nd out where to obtain a reasonable product at a reasonable
price. In a few situations it makes sense to suppose that consumers search randomly
We are grateful to Heski Bar-Isaac, Carli Coetzee, Glenn Ellison, John Morgan, John Vickers and
Glen Weyl for helpful comments, and to the British Academy for funding assistance.
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through available options. In many circumstances, however, consumers consider options
in a non-random manner, and might choose rst to investigate those sellers or products
which have high brand recognition, which are recommended by an intermediary, which are
prominently displayed inside a retail environment, which are known to have a low price,
or from which the consumer has purchased previously.
In Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2011), we examined how a rms
prots and its incentive to choose its price depend on whether it is prominent in a
consumers search process or not. Armstrong et al. (2009) considered a situation in which
one rm is sampled rst by all consumers, and then the remaining rms are sampled
randomly, while Zhou (2011) considered the case where rms were sampled in a known,
deterministic order. We used a search model with di¤erentiated products which was rst
developed by Wolinsky (1986). In this framework, a prominent rms prot is greater,
although its price is lower, than that of its harder-to-nd rivals.
Other work, including Arbatskaya (2007), Armstrong et al. (2009, section 4) and Xu,
Chen, and Whinston (2011), examined the impact of prominence when rms supply a
homogenous product, but where consumers di¤er in their cost of search. In such a setting,
expected prices must be lower in less prominent positions that is to say, a prominent
rm sets a higher price otherwise a consumer would never invest in costly search to nd
another rm.1 In this situation, rational consumers must somehow be compelled to search
through the options in the designated order, or they must nd that sampling the prominent
option is su¢ ciently less costly than sampling others, for otherwise they would be better
o¤ visiting the cheaper, less prominent sellers rst.
A fundamental issue concerns the source of prominence, and in this paper we examine
three ways in which rms can become prominent in search markets. To this end we study
a variety of stylized models of such markets, including markets with homogenous products
and with product di¤erentiation. In section 2 we consider a setting where rms buy
prominence by o¤ering nancial inducements to intermediaries. We consider two variants
of this situation. In the rst, rms pay sales commissions to a salesman (not conditioned on
whether a product is made prominent), as is often the case in one-to-one sales environments
such as for nancial services. The salesman chooses to promote the product with the highest
commission, and in equilibrium he steers the less informed consumers towards the more
expensive product. This could be construed as a form of mis-selling. In the second
1This prediction is veried in McDevitt (2011), who nds that plumbing rms whose chosen name
begins with Acharge higher prices on average than their rivals.
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situation sellers compete to o¤er a lump-sum payment to an intermediary, and whichever
rm o¤ers the most is placed in the prominent position. (This might apply to publishers
competing to be chosen as the book of the monthby a bookshop.) Market performance
can be improved by the ability of rms to buy prominence, as the rm which is willing
to pay the most to be promoted is often the rm which consumers would most like to
encounter rst.
Next, in section 3 we suppose that rms can advertise their prices, for instance on a
price-comparison website. Although consumers need also to investigate a products suit-
ability, consumers will rst investigate those suppliers who advertise low prices. Thus,
instead of rms achieving prominence by means of high commissions, rms here become
prominent when they choose low retail prices. In such a market, in contrast to most search
markets, higher search costs induce lower equilibrium prices since a rms benet from
being investigated rst increases with search costs. Finally, in section 4 we discuss how
in some markets it is plausible that consumers exhibit default bias, in the sense that
people who are already customers of one rm may rst consider this rm when they decide
about subsequent products. In the retail banking market, for example, when consumers
need products such as a mortgage or insurance policy, they often consider their existing
bank rst. In such cases, an incumbent rm is prominent in its customersfuture buying
decisions. Because prominent rms enjoy greater prots than less prominent rivals, a rm
will buy prominence by competing aggressively for a customers initial purchase.
Of course, there are other routes to prominence. For instance, a taxi rm can call itself
A1 Taxisto be listed rst in an alphabetic directory.2 Advertising is another common
method of achieving prominence. With an advertising campaign rms can make their
product or brand prominent in a consumers mind, so that a consumer is more likely to
consider that product rst when she decides what to buy. Bagwell and Ramey (1994)
propose a model with homogeneous products in which some consumers choose rst to
investigate the rm which advertises the most intensively, which is thereby prominent in
these consumers search decisions. (In their model, advertising contains no information
about price or product attributes, but is done purely to inuence search behavior.) Owing
to assumed scale economies, when a rm has greater demand it o¤ers a lower price, and
therefore it is indeed rational for these consumers to coordinate on the rm which advertises
2McDevitt (2011) documents how a high proportion of rms in certain home emergency markets
choose their name so as to appear early in the phone book. In the most extreme case, 46% of locksmiths
in Chicago have names which begin with Aor a number.
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the most. Because a rm enjoys a discrete jump in demand when it advertises even slightly
more than its rivals, in equilibrium rms choose their advertising intensities according to a
mixed strategy. Haan and Moraga Gonzalez (2011) present a related model with product
di¤erentiation in which a rm which advertises more intensively than a rival is more likely
(but not certain) to be considered rst by consumers. Since a rms prot increases when a
greater proportion of consumers sample it rst, rms have an incentive to buy prominence
in this way. In their basic symmetric model, all rms advertise with the same intensity,
with the result that consumer search ends up being random and advertising expenditures
are pure waste.
A way to pay for prominence which has recently been analyzed extensively, for instance
by Chen and He (2006), Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007), Varian (2007) and
Athey and Ellison (2011), concerns sponsored links on search engines. In broad terms the
seller which pays the most for a specic search term on a search engine will be prominently
displayed on the results returned when someone types in that search term. Since internet
users often click on prominent links rst (either because this is their rule of thumb, or
because they have learnt that sellers who are prepared to pay the most to be prominent
are often the most relevant), it is worthwhile for sellers to pay for prominence in this way.
We discuss related issues in more detail in the next section.
2 Paid Promotion
In some markets, intermediaries highlight one product from among the available options
which a consumer should consider rst. Examples include search engines which list some
results more prominently, nancial advisors and other one-to-one sales advisors who choose
the order in which they present options to consumers, doctors who recommend a course of
medical treatment, stores which put some products on prominent display at eye level or
with greater shelf space,3 shopping malls which put a particular store in a prime position,
a motoring magazine which favourably reviews a particular car, or a bookseller promoting
its book of the month. While the hope is that better or cheaper products will be chosen
3Dreze, Hoch, and Purk (1994) report results from experiments in stores their own and previous
research about how a products position on the shelves, which products are adjacent, and the area taken
up by the product on the shelf all matter for a consumers propensity to purchase. For instance, they
report a study showing that a 100% increase in shelf space for a product induces a 20% increase in sales.
Table 4 in their paper shows that vertical location is more important than horizontal location on the shelf,
and being placed at eye level could double the chance of buying a brand of breakfast cereal.
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for special treatment in these ways, a natural worry is that the intermediary will promote
an unsuitable or expensive product when paid to do so.4
There are at least two natural formats for the nancial incentives which sellers provide
to the intermediary: (i) the intermediary is paid per sale on a commission basis, regardless
of whether the product is prominent or not, and (ii) the incentive takes the form of a lump-
sum payment to the intermediary conditioned on the product being made prominent.5
In many cases, especially in a one-to-one sales environment as is common with nancial
services, marketing e¤orts can be hard to monitor and format (i) is more likely to apply.
Given the menu of commission rates he is o¤ered, the salesman then decides which product
to promote. Note that format (i) can be implemented in a retailing context when a supplier
o¤ers its product to a store with a specied wholesale price and a specied retail price.
The margin between the retail and the wholesale price is then the commissionpaid to
give the store an incentive to favour its product.6 Format (ii) applies best to situations in
which a supplier can monitor the marketing e¤orts of the intermediary (e.g., a publisher
knows that its book was indeed the book of the month).
We discuss these two cases in turn.
Commission sales. To investigate this rst situation, we study a variant of Varian
(1980) whereby Varians framework is modied to allow the intermediary (or salesmanfor
brevity in the following) to steer the uninformed portion of consumers towards a particular
product. In more detail, two sellers supply a homogenous product which all consumers
value at v. A fraction  of consumers costlessly observe the two retail prices o¤ered by
the sellers (and buy from the lowest-price seller) and a fraction 1    of consumers only
4Anecdotal evidence suggests that some bookstores recommend books before they have even been
read. One UK bookstore was alleged in 2006 to charge publishers £ 50,000 a week to guarantee a book a
prominent position in the stores 542 high street shops and inclusion in catalogues and other advertising.
A trade body suggested that 70 per cent of publisher promotional budgets were spent on so-called below-
the-lineschemes operated by bookshops rather than more traditional advertising. For more details, see
the article in the (UK) Sunday Times by Robert Winnett and Holly Watt titled £ 50,000 to get a book
on recommended list, 28 May 2006.
5In terms of online advertising, which is one of the leading ways to pay for prominence, the rst form
of payment is akin to per-click charging, where the advertiser pays the search engine each time someone
visits the advertisers website. The second form is more akin to so-called per-impression charging, where
an advertiser pays for the right for (say) a banner advert on a particular website, and pays each time a
consumer visits that website.
6See Cassady (1939) for an early discussion of this point.
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consider a single product and buy if the retail price of that product is below v. The salesman
has the ability to steer the 1    less informed consumers to buy either of the products.
Suppose that a rm chooses its retail price, p, and commission rate, b, simultaneously (and
simultaneously with the rival seller). A rm pays commission b to the salesman every time
a sale of its product is made. We assume that the salesman has no ability to alter the
retail price, for instance by reducing the price below the stipulated price from the seller by
contributing a portion of his commission to the consumer. (Later, we discuss the impact
of relaxing this assumption.)
First, note that the salesman will choose to promote the high-commission product,
regardless of how the two retail prices compare (as long as prices do not exceed v). This
is because the salesmans marketing e¤ort cannot inuence the choice of the informed
consumers at all, but fully determines the choice made by the uninformed consumers.
Hence, the salesman will direct the uninformed consumers towards the product which pays
a higher commission rate.
Second, there are no equilibria in which rms set either a deterministic price or a
deterministic commission rate (or both). For instance, if its rival is known to o¤er the
deterministic retail price p, then a rm enjoys a discrete jump in its demand if it slightly
undercuts this price since it then sells to all the informed consumers. Likewise, if its rival
o¤ers a deterministic commission rate, a rm has an incentive to pay a slightly higher
commission, since then the salesman directs all the uninformed consumers to its product.
We therefore look for a (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium. The following prelimi-
nary result (proved in the Appendix) shows that in any such equilibrium high commission
payments are associated with high retail prices:
Lemma 1 Let 
  [0; v]2 be the support of the joint distribution of (p; b) in a mixed
strategy equilibrium. Then 
 cannot include two pairs (p1; b1) and (p2; b2) with p1 < p2 and
b1 > b2.
In essence, this result indicates that there is a deterministic and increasing relationship
between a rms choice of b and p. Since high commissions are associated with high retail
prices, the salesman promotes the highly priced product due to the high commission he
then receives. This could be interpreted as mis-selling, since uninformed consumers are
directed to buy the more expensive product.7
The next result characterizes the equilibrium in more detail:
7This model could also apply to sponsored search auctions, where the highest bidder for a particular
keyword was listed rst, and each advertiser pays its own bid each time someone clicks its webpage. Such
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Proposition 1 There is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each rm chooses
its retail price p according to c.d.f. G(p) with support [pmin; v], where G() satises
(1  )[1 G(p)] = 1  1
1 +
 
1 

2 v
p
  1
 (1)
and
pmin = (1  )v ;
and chooses its commission as a deterministic function of its price so that b = B(p), where
B(p) =
1  

(p  pmin) : (2)
It is useful to discuss the main ideas involved in the construction of this equilibrium.
Suppose that rm 2 follows the proposed equilibrium strategy. Then, since the salesman
promotes the higher-commission product, rm 1s expected prot if it chooses the pair
(p; b) is
(p; b) = (p  b)[(1  ) Pr(~b < b) + Pr(~p > p)]
= (p  b) (1  )G  B 1(b)+ (1 G(p)) : (3)
In equilibrium a rm will be indi¤erent between all choices (p;B(p)) for p 2 [pmin; v] and for
a given p in the support, a rms expected prot is maximized over all possible commission
rates b by choosing b = B(p). Therefore, a rms prot must be locally at in all
directions at the point (p;B(p)). In particular, a rms prot in (3) must be unchanged
(to rst order) if it increases both p and b equally by some small amount " starting at
b = B(p). Since this change has no impact on the rms margin p  b, from (3) we require
that
d
d"

(1  )G  B 1 (B(p) + ")+ (1 G(p+ "))
"=0
= 0 ;
i.e., that
(1  ) g(p)
B0(p)
  g(p) = 0
a system is similar to the early system for selling online advertising, as described by Edelman et al. (2007,
pp. 245-246). Since that time, sponsored search positions have usually been allocated with a generalized
second-price auction, so that the ith highest bidder for a particular keyword is listed in the ith position
but pays the (i+ 1)th highest bid per click. In our simple duopoly model, this corresponds to a situation
in which the highest bidder is made prominent, but pays the losing bidders commission rate. (However,
such a mechanism would not be practical in many one-to-one sales environments.)
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so that
B0(p)  1  

for all p 2 [pmin; v] :
Thus, the commission rate is a linear (a¢ ne) function of a rms price.8 When a rm o¤ers
the lowest possible commission rate b which might be o¤ered in equilibrium, it knows for
sure it will not be made prominent by the salesman, in which case it should o¤er no
commission at all. We deduce that in equilibrium we must have B(pmin) = 0, and so the
commission schedule is as in (2).
For now, assume that the rm chooses commission b = B(p) in (2) when it chooses its
price p, and consider its incentive to choose p. From (3), its prot with p is
1

[(2  1)p+ (1  )pmin] [(1  )G(p) + (1 G(p))] :
Since in equilibrium the price p = v is sometimes chosen, this prot must be equal to
1 

[(2  1)v + (1  )pmin]. To maintain the rms indi¤erence over price, the c.d.f. G
must satisfy (1), and pmin is then determined from the condition G(pmin) = 0. Note that
G(p) in (1) is increasing in p for pmin  p  v. One can also check that p   b > 0 for
all pmin  p  v, so that a rm always obtains a positive margin when it makes a sale.9
It remains to verify (as we do in the Appendix) that a rm has no unilateral incentive to
deviate to (p; b) with b 6= B(p).
In this equilibrium, the uninformed consumers are directed to buy the more expensive
product. A rm either serves the uninformed consumers (when it happens to set the higher
retail price) or the informed consumers (when it is the cheaper supplier). When  is close
to 1, so that most consumers are well informed, then neither the rms nor the salesman
can extract signicant prot. When almost all consumers are uninformed (  0), retail
prices are approximately equal to the monopoly price v, but almost all of this price is
extracted by the salesman, who can steer almost all consumers with his marketing e¤orts.
8This linearity is the chief modelling advantage of assuming there are just two sellers. If there were
n > 2 sellers, the corresponding formula becomes
B0(p) =
1  


G(p)
1 G(p)
n 2
so that there is a nonlinear relationship between b and p which depends on the (endogenous) form of
G(). This complicates the analysis considerably compared to this duopoly setting where we can deduce
the shape of B(p) without rst calculating G(p). Note that with more than two rms, the commission
schedule B(p) is strictly convex in p.
9Note that p > B(p) if and only if (1   2)p < (1   )2v. If   1=2, this inequality surely holds. If
 < 1=2, then (1  )2=(1  2) is increasing in  and it equals 1 at  = 0, so the inequality also holds.
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This trade-o¤ can also be seen by noting that a rms equilibrium prot is  = (1  )v,
which reaches its maximum at  = 1
2
.
This analysis presumes that the salesman cannot a¤ect a sellers retail price, and thus
there is a form of (minimum) retail price maintenance applied by sellers. Suppose instead
that the salesman can reduce the price a consumer pays for a product by contributing a
portion of his commission b. In the equilibrium in Proposition 1, does the salesman have
an incentive to o¤er such a discount? Suppose the high-price seller chooses (pH ; bH) while
the low-price seller chooses (pL; bL), where bi and pi are related by (2). If the salesman
does not alter the retail prices, his expected commission payment is
(1  )bH + bL (4)
as the informed consumers buy the low-price product and the uninformed consumers buy
the expensive product. The alternative strategy involves the salesman reducing the retail
price of the expensive product (with a high commission) so that all consumers choose to
buy it. To do this entails discounting pH by (pH   pL) to make it competitive with the
cheaper product. When he does this, his net commission payment from each consumer is
bH   (pH   pL) :
However, this net commission payment is lower than the payment in (4) he receives when
he does not distort retail prices if (bH   bL) < pH   pL. One can check from (2) that this
must be true. We deduce that in the equilibrium in Proposition 1, the salesman has no
incentive to discount either rms retail price, even when he has the ability to do so.
There are at least two natural benchmarks with which to compare the equilibrium
outcome when commissions are paid. The rst benchmark is when there is no salesman, and
the uninformed consumers buy randomly from the two rms. In this case the framework
reduces to Varian (1980)s model. Again, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in prices,
and if its rival chooses its price according to c.d.f. G^(), a rms prot when it chooses
price p is modied from (3) to be
p

1  
2
+ (1  G^(p))

:
To maintain the rms indi¤erence over price, this prot must always equal 1
2
(1  )v, the
prot when the rm sets the highest possible price. Therefore, the c.d.f. for prices with
random search is given by
1  G^(p) = 1  
2

v
p
  1

(5)
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with the lowest possible price being p^min = 1 1+v. One can check that G^(p) > G(p) for
p^min < p < v, where G is described in (1), and so retail prices are higher, in the sense of
rst-order stochastic dominance, when rms pay commissions to a salesman to promote
their product relative to the situation with random search. This is due in part to the
sales commissions which articially inate the marginal cost of selling a product. However,
whether rms enjoy greater prots when they pay commission is ambiguous. Without
commission payments, each rm makes expected prot ^ = 1
2
(1 )v, while in the regime
with commissions a rm makes expected prot  = (1   )v. Thus, more prot is
obtained with commission payments when  > 1
2
, so that the uninformed consumers are
in the minority. But when the uninformed consumers are in the majority, the two rms
end up playing a prisoners dilemma due to the erce competition to become prominent.
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Figure 1: Expected prices and commissions
Figure 1 plots the expected prices paid in these two regimes as a function of , the
proportion of informed consumers. (Here, v = 1.) The two bold lines depict expected prices
when commissions are paid, where the upper of these lines is the expected price paid by
the uninformed and the lower line is the expected price paid by the informed consumers.10
The dotted line represents the expected commission paid to the salesman.11 The two feint
10When commission is paid, the expected price paid by an uninformed consumer is the expected value
of the maximum of two i.i.d. draws from the c.d.f. in (1), while the expected price paid by an informed
consumer is the expected value of the minimum of two such draws.
11This is simply the commission payment in (2) evaluated at the expected price paid by all consumers,
which is  times the price paid by the informed consumers plus 1  times the price paid by the uninformed
consumers.
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lines depict the corresponding prices in the Varian model where no commissions are paid
and search is random.12 The two regimes have the same outcome for consumers when
 = 0 (when the monopoly price p = v is chosen for sure) and when  = 1 (when the
competitive price p = 0 is chosen). However, for intermediate values of , the prices paid
in the commission regime are substantially higher than when no commissions are paid.
Indeed, in most cases an uninformed consumer in the no-commission regime pays a lower
price than even the informed consumers do in the commission regime.
The second benchmark with which to compare the outcome with commission payments
is to suppose that the salesman is necessary for consumers to buy the product (unlike
Varians model with random search), but now the salesman is paid by consumers rather
than by sellers.13 Suppose that when the salesman is paid by consumers, say in the form of
a lump-sum consultation fee, he directs the uninformed consumers to the cheaper product.
(This might be because, all else equal, he has a small intrinsic preference for selling the
correct product to consumers.) In this case, all consumers buy the cheaper product and
in Bertrand fashion the two sellers are forced to set retail prices equal to cost (zero in
this case). The outcome for consumers then depends on how much they have to pay
the salesman for his advice. One assumption is that the consultation fee is set equal to
the revenue the salesman received under the commission regime, so that the salesman
is indi¤erent between the two regimes, perhaps because the advice industry needs to be
supportive of a policy shift from a commission-based model to a consumer-fee model. In
this case, the expected total price (the price for the product plus the fee to the salesman)
paid by any consumer is simply the dotted line on Figure 1. From the gure it follows that
all consumers are better o¤ when they pay the salesman compared to when sellers pay the
salesman. In fact, they are also better o¤ when they pay the salesman than when they
search randomly (where prices are the feint lines on the gure).
This section has described a model where rms attempt to inuence a salesmans mar-
keting e¤orts by means of commission payments. The salesman gives prominence to the
product which pays the highest commission, and in equilibrium this entails steering unin-
12The expected price paid by the informed consumers is again the expected value of the minimum of
two prices, but this time taken from the c.d.f. in (5), while the expected price paid by the uninformed
consumers is just the expected value of one price draw from the same distribution.
13The UK regulator, the Financial Services Authority, published rules in March 2010 concerning how
nancial advice can be remunerated. The rules state that an advisor will not be able to accept commission
for recommending products, and the consumer fee for advice must be agreed between the consumer and
the advisor, rather than between the seller and the advisor. See FSA (2010) for further details.
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formed consumers towards the more expensive product. The outcome for consumers, both
informed and uninformed, is poor: worse than the situation without commission payments
where the uninformed shop randomly, and far worse than a situation in which consumers
pay directly for advice.14
Lump-sum payment for prominence. Consider next the case where the nancial
inducement for prominence is a lump-sum payment, conditional on whether the product
is promoted or not. In more detail, suppose that there are two symmetric rms, and an
intermediary auctions o¤ the right to the prominent position. The highest bidder obtains
the prominent position and pays its bid, while the loser pays nothing. Once the prominent
position is awarded, the two rms then choose their retail prices. (In contrast to the
commission sales case, here it is often natural to assume that rms observe who has won
the prominent position before setting their prices.) Suppose that when rms choose their
equilibrium prices, the prominent rm makes prot H (excluding the lump-sum payment
to the intermediary), while the less-prominent rm makes prot L < H . Given that the
prize of prominence is awarded to a single rm, each rm is willing to pay up to H   L
for the right to be prominent. The result of the auction is that both rms bid up to this
amount, and the prize is awarded at random to one rm, who is then made prominent.
Since the prominent rm has paid a lump-sum fee equal to H   L, the net prot of each
rm is equal to L. Suppose that 0 is each rms equilibrium prot with random search
and L < 0 so that the prot of the less-prominent rm is lower than the rm would make
in a regime in which consumers search randomly. Then when the intermediary auctions
o¤ the right to be prominent the two rms are forced to play a prisoners dilemma and in
equilibrium both rms are worse o¤ relative to the case where no rm was prominent.15
Whether the intermediary mis-sells the prominent product in this context is ambiguous,
and depends in part on whether products are homogenous or di¤erentiated. As discussed
14Inderst and Ottaviani (2010) present an alternative model of potential mis-selling, where the salesman
advises consumers about the suitability of a product rather than its price. There, no consumers are
informed, and must rely on the salesman to advise them about which product to buy. The salesman has
only a noisy signal about the suitability of a product, and he has an intrinsic preference to recommend
the suitable product to a consumer. However, this preference can be overturned if sellers set high enough
commissions.
15Armstrong et al. (2009, page 221) show that L < 0 in their particular model with di¤erentiated
products. Related e¤ects are found in Choi and Kim (2010), who study the outcome when an internet
service provider o¤ers to give transmission priority in its lines to one of two content providers. Priority
in markets with congestion plays a somewhat similar role to prominencein markets with search frictions.
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in the introduction, with homogeneous products we expect that the prominent rm will
set a higher price than its rivals, and those consumers with a higher search cost will be
directed to buy the more expensive product (as in the previous case with commission
sales). By contrast, with di¤erentiated products as in Armstrong et al. (2009), we expect
that the promoted product is o¤ered at a lower price than the rival product. However,
although consumers are guided to the cheaper product rst, this does not mean that
consumer surplus or overall e¢ ciency is increased compared to a situation with random
search. Armstrong et al. (2009) show in a uniform example that consumers are worse o¤
and welfare declines when one rm is made prominent. This is because the non-prominent
rms are induced to charge higher prices and the resulted non-uniform prices across rms
lead to less e¢ cient match between consumers and products.
Nevertheless, there are a number of situations in which awarding the prominent position
to the highest bidder is likely to lead to more e¢ cient outcomes, especially when sellers
di¤er in the quality or cost of the product they supply. Armstrong et al. (2009, section
3) present a model where rms di¤er in their quality, and show that the rm with the
highest quality product is willing to pay the most (as a lump sum) to become prominent,
and consumers also benet when this rm is placed at the start of their search process.
In this model, prominenceacts as a signal of otherwise unobserved product quality, and
this improves market performance. This e¤ect was discussed in a specic model in which
each rm had linear demand and qualitywas indexed by the vertical intercept of this
demand. However, the result applies much more widely. Indeed, it applies whenever the
rm from a pool of heterogeneous rms which is prepared to pay the most to become a
monopolist is also the monopolist from the pool of rms which consumers would most like
to face.
To see this, suppose there are a large number of heterogeneous rms in the market,
indexed by i = 1; 2:::. Specically, suppose the match utility from rm i is distributed
with c.d.f. Fi(u) and that this rm has constant marginal cost of supply ci. Suppose
in the equilibrium with random search that consumers obtain expected consumer surplus
V from participating in the market. Since there are many rms, each rm then obtains
approximately zero prots. A rm which is placed in the prominent position and which sets
price p will sell whenever u  p  V , and so makes prot i = maxp(p  ci)(1 Fi(p+V )),
where pi maximizes this prot. (In fact, the rm will choose this price pi even if it is in a
less prominent position.) Since non-prominent rms make negligible prots, the rm which
is willing to pay the most to be in the prominent position is the rm i with the highest i.
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Expected consumer surplus when rm i is placed in the prominent position is
vi 
Z 1
pi+V
(u  pi)dFi(u) + Fi(pi + V ))V = V +
Z 1
pi+V
(1  Fi(u))du :
In many situations the rm with the highest i is also the rm with the highest vi,
so that  and v are positively correlated in the population of rms. To take one simple
case, suppose that the only way in which rms di¤er is in their cost ci, and each rm
generates the same distribution of match utilities. Then the rm with the lowest cost is
willing to pay most to be in the prominent position, and this rm also o¤ers the lowest
price to consumers. Whenever the highest i and the highest vi coincide, auctioning o¤
the prominent position to the rm which is willing to pay the most will increase consumer
surplus and total welfare, relative to the situation with random search.16 ;17
3 Price-Directed Search
Price comparison websites are now a major part of the retailing landscape.18 As long as
a consumer has access to the internet, she can almost costlessly gain access to a list of
16Another instance of this situation is seen in the extension of Wolinsky (1986)s model developed in
Eliaz and Spiegler (2011). Here, a product is suitable with some probability q, which di¤ers across rms.
If a product is suitable, its value is taken from a common distribution, while if the product is unsuitable
its value is zero. A rms quality q does not a¤ect its pricing decision, and the rm with the highest
q is willing to pay the most to be prominent, and that is also the rm which consumers would most like
to investigate rst. Similar e¤ects are also seen in models of sponsored-link auctions, as studied by Athey
and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2006). There, rms di¤er in the likelihood of providing a relevant
match for a consumer, and an advertiser who is more likely to provide a relevant match is willing to pay
more to be listed prominently on the search results page. (There is no e¤ective price competition between
advertisers in these papers.) It is therefore rational for consumers to investigate the links in the order
presented on the page, as the more relevant links are listed at the top. Again, paying for prominence
improves the e¤ectiveness of consumer search.
17Of course, if  and v were instead negatively correlated in the population of rms, then when the
prominent position is sold to the highest bidder, consumers are made worse o¤ relative to the situation
with random search. Jerath, Ma, Park, and Srinivasan (2010) consider a model in which a higher quality
rm may prefer to be displayed in a less prominent position than other rms, once the reduced advertising
payments are taken into account. Relatedly, McDevitt (2011) shows that plumbing rms whose names
start with Atend to receive a greater number of complaints from consumers, suggesting they are often
lower-quality suppliers.
18See Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan (2009) and Ellison and Fisher Ellison (2009), and the papers
cited there, for background to this topic. In the literature on search in labour markets, recent papers have
analyzed directed search, where employers advertise their wages and workers choose their search order
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prices from various suppliers for a wide range of consumer items. Sometimes products may
be approximately homogeneous, so that price is mostly what matters for a consumer. In
such cases, price comparison websites may go a long way towards achieving competitive
outcomes.19 An important early model of a price comparison website with homogenous
products was presented in Baye and Morgan (2001). There, a number of symmetric rms
supply a product, and rms can advertise their prices on a website to which (in equilibrium)
all consumers have access. There are two groups of consumers: some consumers care only
about nding the cheapest supplier, while other loyal consumers will only buy from a
single rm to which they have a strong brand preference. The website charges a lump-
sum listing fee to sellers, and each seller decides whether or not to put its price on the
website. In equilibrium, the decision to advertise on the website is random, and this in
turn generates prices which are also random. The rm which chooses to advertise and
which happens to o¤er the lowest price on the website will sell to all the price sensitive
consumers, and other rms will sell only to their pool of loyal consumers.
For some products, however, price is not the only consideration and a consumer cares
also about product suitability. For instance, a traveller may look for a ight from London to
New York on a travel website, and nd various ights listed in order of increasing price, but
only a subset of the ights meet the travellers needs in terms of airport location, departure
time, and so on. Nevertheless, price is still an important factor for the consumer, and it
is plausible that the consumer will investigate the options in order of increasing price. In
these situations, sellers become prominentin a consumers search process by posting the
lowest price on the website.20
In theory, one could try to use the search model with product di¤erentiation in Wolin-
sky (1986) to study this question. However, it turns out that this framework, where a
consumers match utility is independently distributed across rms, apparently does not
accordingly. An important additional feature in the labour market relative to a typical consumer market
is that a job vacancy can be lled, so that workers do not necessarily visit the highest-wage employer rst
if they anticipate that many other workers will apply for the same post. See Rogerson et al. (2005, section
5) for discussion of these models.
19For the purposes of this discussion, we ignore important caveats to this claim, including the ability that
sellers have to obfuscatetheir true price. For instance, a seller might post a low priceon the website,
but then compensate for this by excessive postage and packingcharges. See Ellison and Fisher Ellison
(2009) for further discussion of this point.
20By contrast, in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) where price information is imperfect, the direction
of causality is reversed, and a rm which happens to be prominent will then choose to o¤er a lower price
than its rivals.
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lead to an easily tractable solution for how rms choose prices on a price-comparison web-
site. Instead, in this section we present a variant of Wolinskys model which is tractable,
and which provides insight about the impact of price advertising on market performance.
Suppose that two rms compete to o¤er a di¤erentiated product in a Hotelling frame-
work. Specically, the two rms are located at the ends of the unit interval [0; 1], and
consumers are uniformly located on this interval, with brand preference parameter de-
noted ` 2 [0; 1]. The valuation of a consumer at ` for the product supplied by the rm
at 0 is v   `t, where v is the valuation of the consumer for the ideal product and t is the
unit transportcost (not to be confused with the search cost) and captures the extent of
product di¤erentiation. Similarly, her valuation for the product supplied by the rm at 1
is v  (1  `)t. (As usual, we suppose v is su¢ ciently high that the market is fully covered
in equilibrium.) If production cost is normalised to zero, then in the absence of search
frictions, so that consumers have full information about their preferred product and the
two rmsprices, the equilibrium price in this market is p = t.
In the following discussion we introduce search frictions into this market. Specically,
we suppose that each consumer must incur a search cost s to visit a rm to discover its
price (where necessary) and its match utility (where necessary), as well as to purchase
the product. When a consumer visits the rst rm, she discovers her brand preference
parameter x, which then also reveals her match utility at the other rm. Thus, this is a
search model where match utilities are negatively correlated across the two rms, rather
than independently distributed as in Wolinskys model.
The market without the price comparison website. Suppose that consumers choose
their initial rm randomly (i.e., they have no idea about their preferred supplier ex ante
and expect rms to o¤er the same prices). What is the equilibrium price, p, in this
market? Consider the incentive of the rm at 0 to choose its price p. Since consumers
anticipate that both rms choose price p, a consumer who rst visits this rm will buy if
p+ `t  p + (1  `)t+ s ;
where ` is her discovered brand preference parameter and s is the search cost for buying
from the second seller. (Note that in our Hotelling setting once a consumer has investigated
her rst seller, she knows the match utility of the second seller and believes this rms price
is p. We assume that she nevertheless needs to incur the search cost s in order to buy
from the second rm.) Thus, the fraction of those consumers who rst visit the rm and
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who end up buying from that rm is
1
2
+
s+ p   p
2t
:
If a consumer visits the rival rm rst, since consumers anticipate the price p at both
rms, only those consumers at a distance
`  1
2
  s
2t
from the rm at 0 will choose to investigate it. (Note that if s  t, then in equilibrium no
consumers will search beyond the rst sampled rm. To avoid this less interesting case,
we assume s < t henceforth.) They will then buy from this rm unless the price they nd
there is signicantly higher than p (i.e., the surprise is big enough to drive some of them
back to their initial rm, which requires that p > p+s). Thus, at least for local deviations
from the equilibrium price p (i.e., for p  p + s), the rms total demand is
q =
1
2

1
2
+
s+ p   p
2t

+
1
2

1
2
  s
2t

=
1
2
+
p   p
4t
which does not depend on s.21 This is like the full information Hotelling model, but with
di¤erentiation parameter 2t instead of t. Therefore, the equilibrium price is
p = 2t :
This price does not depend on the search cost s so long as s > 0, and so we see that even
tiny search frictions cause equilibrium prices to double. (This is reminiscent of Diamond
(1971)s famous result that arbitrarily small search costs can lead to monopoly prices.)
The reason is that a rm cannot attract more of those consumers who rst visit its rival
with a low price, and so a rms demand elasticity is halved.
The market with the price comparison website. Now suppose that rms advertise
their prices to all potential consumers (e.g., on a price comparison website). By symmetry,
all consumers will rst investigate the rm which posts the lower price, and only go on
to buy from the second rm if their discovered brand preference turns out strongly to
favour the more expensive product. If the two posted prices are pL and pH > pL, where
pH   pL < t  s, then the low-price rm has demand
QL =
1
2
+
s+ pH   pL
2t
21One can check that for a large deviation price p > p + s, the rms demand is q = 12 (
1
2 +
s+p p
2 ) +
1
2 (
1
2 +
p p
2t ). That is, the demand function has a kink at p = p
 + s. But one can show that taking this
into account does not change the equilibrium characterization below even for a small search cost.
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and the high-price rm has demand
QH = 1 QL = 1
2
  s+ pH   pL
2t
: (6)
(As before, once a consumer has investigated her rst seller, she knows the price and the
match utility of the second seller. She nevertheless needs to incur the search cost s to
buy from the second rm.) Notice that QL   QH = s=t when pL = pH , so that there is a
jump in its demand equal to s=t when one rm slightly undercuts its rival.22 Due to this
incentive to undercut and the presence of product di¤erentiation, it is clear that there can
be no symmetric pure-strategy equilibria. It is also true that there are no asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibria either.23 In the following result we derive a (symmetric) mixed-strategy
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose that 0 < s < t. Then the search market with a price comparison
website has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which each rm chooses its price
according to c.d.f. H(p) with support [pmin; pmax], where H() satises
1
2
+
p  p
2t
+
s
2t
[1  2H(p)] = 
p
: (7)
Here  is a rms expected prot in equilibrium and p =
R pmax
pmin
pdH(p) is a rms expected
price in equilibrium.
We now describe how to construct this equilibrium and determine the four unknown
parameters pmin, pmax, p, and . If its rival chooses price with c.d.f. H, a rms expected
demand when it chooses price p 2 [pmin; pmax] is24
Q(p) =
Z p
pmin

1
2
  s+ p  ~p
2t

dH(~p)| {z }
demand when rival charges lower price
+
Z pmax
p

1
2
+
s+ ~p  p
2t

dH(~p)| {z }
demand when rival charges higher price
22Baye et al. (2009) nd in their dataset that a sellers click rate increases by 60 per cent when the
seller lowers its price to become the cheapest seller on the price comparison website. Note that Baye et
al. document that a sellers click rate also depends on its position on the webpage, which reects a second
form of prominence.
23To see this, suppose instead that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium with pL < pH . Since
@QL
@pL
=
@QH
@pH
, the rst-order conditions imply pL=pH = QL=QH . That is, a lower price is associated with a lower
demand, which cannot be the case.
24If instead we adopted Wolinskys model with independent match utilities, expected demand does not
have such a simple expression since the demand term inside each integral will be quadratic rather than
linear in price.
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=
1
2
+
p  p
2t
+
s
2t
[1  2H(p)] : (8)
Since the rm must be indi¤erent between choosing all prices in the interval [pmin; pmax], it
follows that H satises (7). (Notice that this calculation of demand assumes that pmax  
pmin < t   s, and we will check later that this condition is satised in equilibrium.) In
particular, the density for a rms chosen price, h(p), is
h(p) =
1
2s

2t
p2
  1

(9)
which decreases over its support.
To complete the equilibrium characterization, we need to determine the four unknown
parameters. Since H(pmin) = 0 and H(pmax) = 1, expression (7) implies that
t+ p  pmin + s = 2t
pmin
(10)
and
t+ p  pmax   s = 2t
pmax
: (11)
Given the density h in (9), it follows that p must satisfy
p =
1
2s
Z pmax
pmin

2t
p
  p

dp =
1
2s

2t log
pmax
pmin
  1
2
(p2max   p2min)

: (12)
The nal condition is derived from the fact that a rm does not want to set its price higher
than pmax. If a rm chooses p  pmax, it will surely be the more expensive rm, and its
expected prot will be
(p)  p

1
2
  s+ p  p
2t

:
To ensure that the rm has no incentive to do this, we require that (p)  (pmax) for all
p  pmax. Since (p) is a concave function, this requires
pmax  1
2
(t+ p  s) : (13)
On the other hand, given the other rms equilibrium strategy, a rms expected prot is
constant for p 2 [pmin; pmax], so its derivative with respect to p evaluated at pmax (from the
left-hand side) is zero, which from (8) implies
lim
p!p max
Q(p) + pQ0(p) = 0) 1
2
(t+ p  s)  pmax = spmaxh(pmax) : (14)
From (13) and (14), we conclude that
h(pmax) = 0
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and
pmax =
1
2
(t+ p  s) =
p
2t : (15)
(The second equality in (15) used (11).) The four unknowns pmin, pmax, p and  can then
be solved from (10), (12) and the two equalities in (15).25 In the Appendix, we show that
this system does have a unique solution, and the requirement 0 < pmax   pmin < t   s is
satised.
An interesting observation (proved in the Appendix) is that a higher search cost induces
rms to post lower prices and so causes equilibrium prots to fall.
Corollary 1 In the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2, (i) pmin, pmax, p and  all
decrease with s, and (ii) pmax < t so that rms earn less than in the case with random search
without the price comparison website and in the case with perfect consumer information.
Intuitively, a higher search cost implies that consumers are more reluctant to search
beyond the rst rm they encounter, so there is a greater benet to being the rm sampled
rst, and hence a greater incentive to be the rm with the lower price. To illustrate this
feature, Figure 2 depicts the density h() for various search costs. (Here, t = 1.) In the
gure the densities corresponding to lower search costs lie further to the right. When the
search cost is close to zero, the rms post prices which are close to the full information
outcome (p  1 in this example with t = 1). When search costs are higher, the support
of the distribution of prices is wider, but there is a concentration on the low end of the
support. As shown analytically in Corollary 1, in all cases rms chooses prices below
1. (In particular that the presence of the price comparison website acts to reduce prices
relative to the situation with random search, where the equilibrium price in this example
is p = 2 for all positive search costs.) Moreover, prices posted on the website are always
lower than in the situation where consumers are fully informed about price and product
characteristics (where the equilibrium price in this example is p = 1).When search costs
are so high that consumers never investigate both rms (i.e., when s  t), then all demand
goes to the rm with the lower price, and so the price is driven down to cost (zero in this
25We also need to check that a rm has no incentive to charge a price below pmin. If a rm chooses
p  pmin, its expected prots are
^(p)  p

1
2
+
s+ p  p
2t

:
To ensure ^(p)  ^(pmin) for all p  pmin, we require that pmin  12 (t + p + s), which, however, is
automatically true as long as (15) holds and pmin < pmax.
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case) in Bertrand fashion, although consumers must buy a random product rather than
their preferred product.
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Figure 2: Density h(p) when s = 0:5; 0:4; 0:3; 0:2; 0:1; 0:05; 0:025; 0:01; and 0:001
An alternative model of a price comparison website has recently been provided by
Zhang (2010). In his model, each product delivers utility v to a consumer if it is suitable,
which occurs with exogenous probability q. If a product is unsuitable, which occurs with
probability 1   q, it has no value for the consumer. (The suitability of a product is an
i.i.d. random variable across rms and consumers.) A fraction of consumers need to incur
cost s > 0 to determine the suitability of any product, while the remaining consumers
costlessly observe all product characteristics. Suppose these rms advertise their prices
on a price comparison website to which all consumers have access. Since products are
otherwise symmetric, as in our model consumers will optimally search through products
in order of increasing price displayed on the website, and they will buy the rst suitable
product they discover. It is worthwhile for a costly-searcher to keep searching for as long
as the price is not so high as to eliminate the benets of search, and a consumer will
investigate a product so long as its price satises q(v  p) > s. This implies that when the
fraction of costly searchers is large enough, the maximum price that any rm will charge
is
pmax = v   s
q
: (16)
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This implies that equilibrium prot can be decreasing in the cost of search, s, just as
was the case with the Hotelling model we have presented. The reason, however, is quite
di¤erent. In our framework, a higher search cost increased the benet to a rm of being
searched rst by consumers, and this in turn gives rms a more powerful incentive to win
the price-setting contest. In Zhangs model, a high search cost reduces the maximum price
which rms can o¤er in (16), since a consumer must be given an incentive to investigate
the risky product.26
4 Cross-selling
An important set of markets operate in the following manner: consumers buy an initial
core(or gateway) product, and then subsequently they need further products which
are also potentially provided by the supplier of their core product. One natural example
is retail banking: consumers open a standard bank account when young, and when older
they need additional products such as a mortgage, insurance, or a savings account. It is
often the case that a bank can cross-sellthese subsequent products to its pool of existing
customers. Table 7.1 in OFT (2010) shows how 88% of UK customers who have a savings
account will have it at the same bank as their current account, 53% have a credit card
issued by the same bank as their current account, and 27% have a mortgage at the same
bank as their current account.
There are a number of reasons why cross-selling can be so successful. The rm may
have regular interactions with the customer which facilitates more frequent selling op-
portunities than rival rms have, or the rm may possess information about its existing
customers which helps it target suitable products to its customers. Alternatively, the rm
26Wilson (2010) presents an interesting variation on the theme of comparison websites. In his model,
rms can choose and advertise their rm-specic search cost, which is the cost which some consumers
need to incur in order to understand the rms price and how to buy from the rm. (Other consumers are
well informed and always buy from the cheapestl rm.) Thus, his model could be interpreted as one of
cost-directed search. Wilson describes an asymmetric equilibrium in the duopoly case in which one rm
advertises a search cost of zero and the other advertises a high search cost. (He discusses an example where
a car insurance company mounted an advertising campaign to alert potential customers that its products
will not be found on any price-comparison website.) In this equilibrium, the costly searchers investigate
the low-search-cost rm, so that this rm is prominent for these consumers. The reason why one rm has
a unilateral incentive to obfuscateand make it di¢ cult for consumers to comprehend its o¤ering is that,
when it does so, costly shoppers are driven to the rival, which induces the rival to compete less hard for
the informed pool of consumers. The result is that both rms increase their prices.
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may o¤er bundle discounts when its customers buy several products. In this section, we
suggest another reason for the e¤ectiveness of cross-selling, which is that consumers exhibit
default bias in the sense that they rst consider their existing supplier when searching
for subsequent products. That is, a rm is prominent for its existing customers when those
customers search for additional products.
Consider the following illustrative model. There are many symmetric sellers who com-
pete to sell two products to a population of consumers. Product 1 is the coreproduct
sold in period 1, and product 2 is an additional item sold in period 2. We suppose that
rms cannot commit to their product-2 price in the rst period. The discount factor for
the second period is  and the constant marginal cost of producing product i = 1; 2 is ci.
As in Armstrong et al. (2009), product 2 is assumed to be a search good, and consumers
investigate the deals available for that product in a sequential manner. The value of a
rms product 2 is idiosyncratic to consumers, and this value is not observed by consumers
at the time they make their product 1 purchase. Specically, when a consumer investi-
gates a supplier of product 2, she discovers a product with match utility u and price p.
Consumers incur the search cost s for investigating each seller of product 2 (including the
consumers supplier of product 1). The match utility u is independently and identically
distributed across consumers and across rms and distributed with c.d.f. F (u) and support
[umin; umax]. It is convenient to assume that the hazard rate
f(u)
1  F (u) increases with u , (17)
where f = F 0 is the density for u. If a consumer buys product 2 from a seller which has
match utility u and price p, her surplus is u   p. The crucial assumption is that at the
start of the second period consumers sample their product 1 supplier rst, so that their
existing supplier is prominent in a consumers subsequent product searches. Since, as we
will see, a consumer has no strict incentive to search other rms before her own product 1
supplier, this assumption represents a tiny degree of customer inertia or default bias.27
In a symmetric equilibrium, each rm will set some price p1 (to be determined) in the
rst period. In the second period, rms can potentially set di¤erent prices to their existing
customers and to customers they poach from rivals. However, as discussed in Armstrong
27One way to give consumers a strict incentive to consider their existing supplier rst is to assume that
they face a smaller search cost when they do so. This might be because the customer already knows that
rms website address, telephone number, or the physical location of the nearest outlet. (See the following
footnote for an additional reason why consumers might have a strict incentive to investigate their current
supplier rst.)
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et al. (2009, section 2), when there are many rms, a prominent rm does not want to set
di¤erent prices to the two groups. In equilibrium, the price for product 2 is
p2 = c2 +
1  F (a)
f(a)
; (18)
where a is each consumers threshold for match utility given byZ umax
a
(u  a)dF (u) = s ; (19)
so that the incremental benet from one more search is equal to the search cost. The
size of the markup over cost in expression (18) therefore reects the magnitude of search
frictions in the market for product 2, and given assumption (17) this mark-up increases
with s. In the limit as s tends to zero (in which case a tends to umax), the equilibrium
price p2 tends to marginal cost c2. In equilibrium, a  p2 is a consumers ex ante expected
surplus, including her search costs, from participating in the market for product 2.28
In the market for product 2, each consumers searches for a product which has match
utility u at least equal to the threshold a, starting with her existing supplier for product
1. A customer who purchased a rms product 1 will therefore buy that rms product 2
with probability 1 F (a) and so generate expected prot for this rm in the second period
equal to (1  F (a))(p2   c2) = (1  F (a))2=f(a). A customer who purchased a rival rms
core product, however, will generate only negligible prot for the rm in the second period,
since there are many alternative sellers that the customer can buy from even if she does
not buy from her period-1 supplier.
Consider next the market for product 1. We could also model this as a search market,
although this does not add anything of signicance to the analysis. Instead, suppose
that the market for product 1 is a standard Bertrand market with homogeneous products
and full consumer information. Some consumers may be naive or myopic when they buy
product 1, and do not recognize that they will likely buy product 2 from the same rm.
Such consumers buy their core product purely on the basis of its price. However, even
if consumers are forward looking, they anticipate that the product 2 price is as given in
(18), regardless of their choice of supplier for product 1. Therefore, these consumers will
also base their choice of product 1 purely on the lowest price for product 1 available in the
market.
28Thus, a consumer nds it worthwhile to engage in search whenever a p2  0, which requires that the
search cost s not be too large. More precisely, if pM2 is the monopoly price which maximizes (p2   c2)(1 
F (p2)), then the condition which ensures an active search market is that s is small enough that a > pM2 .
24
As discussed, each customer generates expected prot in the second period for her core
supplier equal to (1 F (a))2=f(a). Since this is discounted in period 1 by , it follows that
Bertrand competition for product 1 leads to the equilibrium price
p1 = c1    [1  F (a)]
2
f(a)
:
Thus, rms in equilibrium o¤er a below-cost price for the core product in the rst period
so as to attract more consumers over whom they are prominent in the second period.
The impact of greater search frictions in the market for product 2 is to increase a
consumers cost of searching for a suitable product, to raise the price for product 2, and
to decrease the price for product 1. What is the combined e¤ect on consumers? Assuming
that product 1 has inelastic aggregate demand, total discounted consumer surplus with
search cost s (up to a constant) is  p1 + (a  p2). This decreases with s whenever
[1  F (a)]2
f(a)
+

a  1  F (a)
f(a)

= a  F (a)(1  F (a))
f(a)
increases with a. However, this is necessarily the case whenever the hazard rate condition
(17) is satised. Thus, we expect that increased search frictions in the market for product
2 will harm consumers, and policy-makers are justied when they attempt to reduce search
frictions.
It is useful to compare the outcome when consumers have this default bias to the situa-
tion where there is no such bias and consumers search randomly for product 2. Without a
default bias, the equilibrium price for product 2 is unchanged, and given by (18). However,
a rm now has no advantage in selling product 2 to its existing product 1 customers, and so
there is no incentive to build market share for the core product. Therefore, the equilibrium
price for product 1 is simply p1 = c1, and the impact of this form of default bias is to leave
the product 2 products price unchanged but to increase the price for the core product 1.
Consumers therefore benet from this form of inertia.
This outcome has some similarities with markets where consumers incur switching costs
when they change their supplier. (See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for an overview of the
literature on switching costs.) In particular, since a rms existing customers are more
likely to buy from it again than are the customers of rival rms, a rm cares about its
initial market share and is willing to invest in building up its customer base. Nevertheless,
there are signicant di¤erences between our approach and markets with switching costs.
For instance, in our model customers are not locked-in to their existing supplier in any
sense, and a customer incurs no extra cost if she decides to buy subsequent products
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elsewhere (if the initial search cost in the second period is the same as for subsequent
searches). As such, the pattern of prices over time is not so much bargains then rip-o¤s
as typically seen in switching cost models, but rather bargains then the usual price.
Moreover, rms have no incentive to set di¤erent prices to existing and new customers,
and a rms existing customer base is not exploited.29 Finally, as discussed above, the
presence of inertia benets consumers in this model. In many two-period switching cost
models, consumers are roughly speaking left una¤ected by the presence of switching
costs, since what they gain in the rst period is clawed back in the second.
In sum, the model in this section provides a relatively benign rationale for why cross-
selling might be prevalent in markets such as retail banking, and why customer inertia
might actually boost consumer welfare.
5 Conclusions
In markets with search frictions, a seller can make greater prots when it is prominent, in
the sense that consumers tend to consider its product before they consider rival products.
Search costs imply that consumers will buy when a product is merely satisfactory rather
than being the best in the market, and this gives an advantage to the rst rm in a
consumers search process. This article has discussed three routes by which rms can
make their products more prominent in consumer search markets.
First, sellers could pay an intermediary to promote their products. Competition to be
prominent induces sellers to pay substantial fees to the intermediary. This can mean that
rms are forced to play a prisoners dilemma and are made worse o¤compared to a situation
with purely random consumer search. In addition, sales commissions raise the marginal
cost of supplying a product, and this raises the average retail price paid by consumers
relative to random search. Moreover, especially when products are homogeneous, these
markets may involve mis-selling, in that consumers who are ignorant or who have high
search costs are steered towards the more expensive products. In such cases, the market
with sales commission performs poorly for consumers, relative to the case with random
search and relative to a situation in which consumers pay the intermediary directly for
29If we had a relatively small number of rms, then following the analysis in Armstrong, Vickers, and
Zhou (2009), rms would set lower period-2 prices to their existing customers than to their rivalsexisting
customers. This gives a consumer a strict incentive to investigate her existing supplier rst. By contrast,
see Chen (1997) for a model with switching costs in which rms o¤er higher prices to their existing
customers than they o¤er to their rivals customers.
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advice. Nevertheless, market performance can sometimes be improved when rms pay
for prominence, especially when rms are asymmetric in terms of their quality or cost of
supply. In such cases, the rm which is willing to pay most to be prominent is often also
the rm which consumers would most like to encounter rst.
Second, instead of a supplier being made prominent because of costly kickbacks paid
to an intermediary, which often results in the prominent rm having the highest retail
price, a rm can become prominent if it advertises the lowest retail price. The increasing
use of price comparison websites means that many consumers are well informed about
prices in the market, and their only search costs involve discovering which products are
suitable. In the symmetric model we analyzed, the optimal search strategy for consumers
was to investigate products in order of increasing price. Since consumers will only go on
to investigate a second product if the cheapest product turns out to be unsuitable, the
cheapest rm has a signicantly greater market share than its rivals (even if prices are
very similar). The resulting intense competition to become prominent drives down retail
prices, and consumers benet when their search process is directed by price advertising. In
fact, when search frictions are more pronounced, rms have a greater incentive to be the
rst rm sampled, and so prices are pushed lower. By comparing the models in sections 2
and 3 we see that di¤erent routes to prominence can have very di¤erent welfare properties.
Finally, we discussed how the notion of prominence can help to explain the prevalence
of cross-selling in markets such as retail banking. We supposed that consumers had a
small default bias, in the sense that they rst investigated their existing supplier (say,
the supplier of their main bank account) when considering a second product (such as a
mortgage or credit card). Their existing supplier is therefore prominent in a consumers
subsequent search plans. Because a prominent rm obtains greater prots than its harder-
to-nd rivals, a rm has an incentive to compete hard in the initial core market, and in
our model the price for the initial product was driven below cost. Firms pay for later
prominence by subsidizing a consumers initial purchase.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose in contrast to the statement of the result that there exist
two pairs (p1; b1) and (p2; b2) in 
 such that p1 < p2 and b1 > b2. Then we have
(p1 b1)
h
(1  ) Pr(~b < b1) + Pr(~p > p1)
i
 (p1 b2)
h
(1  ) Pr(~b < b2) + Pr(~p > p1)
i
and
(p2 b2)
h
(1  ) Pr(~b < b2) + Pr(~p > p2)
i
 (p2 b1)
h
(1  ) Pr(~b < b1) + Pr(~p > p2)
i
:
(Here, these hold with equality if (p1; b2) and (p2; b1) also lie within 
.) The rst inequality
implies

1  (b2   b1) Pr(~p > p1)  (p1   b2) Pr(
~b < b2)  (p1   b1) Pr(~b < b1) ;
and the second one implies

1  (b1   b2) Pr(~p > p2)  (p2   b1) Pr(
~b < b1)  (p2   b2) Pr(~b < b2) :
Adding the pair of inequalities yields

1  (b1   b2) [Pr(~p > p2)  Pr(~p > p1)]  (p2   p1)[Pr(
~b < b1)  Pr(~b < b2)] :
This inequality, however, cannot hold since the left-hand side is negative while the right-
hand side is positive, which leads to a contradiction. 
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Proof of Proposition 1: Given that rm 2 adopts the equilibrium strategy, rm 1s
expected prot, if it sets (p; b) with 0  b < p  v, is
(p; b) = (p  b) (1  )G  B 1(b)+ (1 G(p)) ;
where
B 1(b) = (1  )v + 
1  b :
A su¢ cient condition for no protable deviation is that for any p  v , (p; b) is concave
in b and reaches its maximum at b = B(p).
One can verify that b = 0 at b = B(p), and
bb =  2(1  )g
 
B 1(b)
 dB 1(b)
db
+ (1  )(p  b)g0  B 1(b)dB 1(b)
db
2
:
Then
bb < 0, (p  b)g
0 (B 1(b))
g (B 1(b))
dB 1(b)
db
< 2 : (20)
From the expression for G(p) in (1), we have
g(p) =
(1  )2v
2p+ (1  )2 (v   p)2 ; g0(p) = 2(1  )(1  2)
2v
2p+ (1  )2 (v   p)3 ;
and so
g0(p)
g(p)
=
2
(1 )2
1 2 v   p
:
By using the expression for B 1(b), (20) holds if
p  b
1 
1 2v   b1 
< 1   :
When the denominator in the left-hand side is negative (e.g., when  > 1
2
), this condition
must hold. Now suppose the denominator is positive (so  must be less than 1
2
). Then the
condition holds if
p <
(1  )2
1  2 v :
This is true since the right-hand side is an increasing function of  for  < 1
2
and equals v
at  = 0. 
31
Proof of Proposition 2: The four equilibrium parameters pmin, pmax, p, and  are
determined by the four equations in (10), (12) and (15). To solve this system, we introduce
a new variable
x =
pmin
pmax
:
In the following, we will rst solve p and  as functions of x from (10) and (15), and then
substitute them into (12) to obtain an equation determining x.
Using (15) we can rewrite (10) as
2pmax + 2s = pmin +
p2max
pmin
) 2 + 2sp
2t
= x+
1
x
)  = 2s
2
t(x+ 1=x  2)2 : (21)
From (15) we obtain
p = 2
p
2t+ s  t = 4s
x+ 1=x  2 + s  t : (22)
We then rewrite condition (12), by using (15) again, as
2sp = p2max  log
pmax
pmin
  1
2
(p2max   p2min))  
2s
t
p

= 1  x2 + 2 log x : (23)
Substituting (21) and (22) into (23) yields
t  s
s
=
4 + 1 x
2+2 log x
x+1=x 2
x+ 1=x  2 : (24)
The right-hand side of (24) increases with x and tends to zero as x! 0 and tends to +1
as x ! 1. Hence, expression (24) must have a unique solution in the interval x 2 (0; 1)
whenever t > s > 0.
To ensure that this equilibrium is well dened, we need to check the condition pmax  
pmin < t  s because our equilibrium characterization is predicated on that. This condition
holds if and only if 1   x < (t   s)=pmax. Since pmax =
p
2t = 2s=(x + 1=x   2), the
condition can be written as
1  x < t  s
2s

x+
1
x
  2

:
Using (24), this is equivalent to
 1  x
2 + 2 log x
2(x+ 1=x  2) < 1 + x :
The left-hand side is an increasing function on x 2 [0; 1], and it approaches 1 as x tends
to 1. So the condition holds for any x 2 (0; 1). 
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Proof of Corollary 1: (i) Since the right-hand side of (24) is increasing in x, it follows
that x = pmin=pmax must decrease with s. Since 4 +
1 x2+2 log x
x+1=x 2 is decreasing in x and
so increasing in s, it follows from (24) that 1
s
(x+ 1=x  2) increases with s. Thus, (15)
implies that both pmax and  decrease with s. As x = pmin=pmax decreases with s, pmin
must fall with s as well. Finally, from (23), we obtain
p =  t
2s
(1  x2 + 2 log x)
=

s
x+ 1=x  2

 1  x
2 + 2 log x
x+ 1=x  2

: (25)
(We used (21) to obtain the second equality.) We know both terms in (25) decrease with
s, and therefore p does too.
(ii) Intuitively, as s ! 0 the situation approaches the perfect information case and so
both pmin and pmax tend to t. The result follows as pmax decreases with s. More formally,
from (24), we can see that x! 1 as s! 0. From (24), we also have
t
s
  1

x+
1
x
  2

= 4 +
1  x2 + 2 log x
x+ 1=x  2 :
Thus, as s! 0, t
s
(x+ 1=x  2)! 2 which implies pmax = 2s=(x+ 1=x  2)! t. 
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